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ON AUTOMATIC DEDUCTION 
INTRODUCTION 
Leibniz long ago saw that deductive reasoning and arithmetical calcula- 
tion have much in common. As is well known, he even envisaged a univer- 
sal logical calculus within which all problems of deduction would be 
formulated as problems of calculation; thus the execution of purely clerical 
algorithms, akin to those for addition and multiplication of numerals, would 
suffice to solve such problems when they were properly formulated in the 
calculus. The question whether a statement 9 does or does not follow 
logically from a set J,, ...,J, of other statements as assumptions or prem- 
ises would then be settled, not by debate and argument, but mechanically 
and automatically, just as for example, we settle the question whether 
26,105,181 is or is not the product of 843 and 30,967. This method of 
solving a problem of deduction-by calculation-appears to be, and is, 
quite different from the usual method (if "method" is not indeed a mis- 
nomer) of making a deduction by using intelligence, intuition, insight, or, 
as it is often expressed, by reasoning. 
The same contrast is afforded by the example of a complex intellectual 
game, such as chess. A player normally selects his moves in a game of 
chess by an arcane process of reasoning, intuitive assessment of possible 
positions and advantages, hunches, and the like, which he does not conl- 
pletely-and probably could not if challenged to do so-articulate into a 
routine automatic algorithm. Likewise anyone who must carry out much 
deductive reasoning, such as a mathematician, is unable to give a complete 
set of instructions stating exactly how to do it, even though his own deduc- 
tive capabilities may be extremely powerful and fluent, as is usually the 
case among professional mathematicians. 
The vision of Leibniz was not, then, a trivial one. It is by no means 
obvious that problems of deduction can be formulated as problems of cal- 
culation; nor, for that matter, is it obvious that they cannot. Leibniz himself 
was unable to settle the question, which, as we now know, requires some 
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of the most advanced theory of modern mathematical logic for its treat- 
ment. In the light of modern findings, the situation is quite clear and to 
some extent rather bizarre. On the one hand, Alonzo Church1 has proved 
that there cannot exist a "Leibnizian" algorithm or calculation procedure 
for solving every problem of the form: determine whether or not the state- 
ment 9 logically follows from the assrrmptions J,,...,J,,. It  is not merely 
that the human race will never discover such an algorithm, but that there 
simply is no such algorithm to be discovered or not discovered. Of course 
this result depends on a careful and exact analysis of the concepts involved, 
notably the concepts algorithm, statement, and logical consequence. At 
bottom such analyses are no more than definitions of these otherwise infor- 
mal and loose concepts, and anyone who is not disposed to accept one or 
more of these definitions is not bound to accept the result of Church con- 
cerning them. Nevertheless there is wide agreement that the analyses are 
proper, and that consequently the nonexistence of a universal "Leibnizian" 
algorithm, of the sort defined, is as well established as anything can be. 
In view of this negative result concerning the deduction problem, and of 
our introduction of the analogy of the chess-playing problem, it is of no 
small interest that von Neumann2 has proved the following positive result 
for the game of chess: either there is an algorithm by following which the 
White player can always win, irrespective of how the Black player plays; 
or there is an algorithm by following which the Black player can always 
win, irrespective of how the White player plays; or there is one algorithm 
for each player, such that each following his own algorithm can always 
force a draw, irrespective of how the other player makes his moves. Von 
Neumann's comment on this result is worth quoting: 
But our proof, which guarantees the validity of one (and only one) of these 
three alternatives, gives no practically usable method to determine the true one. 
This relative, human difficulty necessitates the use of those incomplete, heuristic 
methods of playing, which constitute "good" chess; and without it there would 
be no element of "struggle" and "surprise" in that game.' 
Here then the situation is theoretically totally different, for we are as 
mathematically certain of the existence of a chess algorithm, by von 
Neumann's theorem, as we are of the nonexistence of a deduction algorithm, 
by Church's theorem. Yet practically the situation is the same, as far as the 
human mind is concerned; for as von Neumann's remarks indicate, we shall 
never in fact possess a chess algorithm, so that the game will always be 
played with the help of intelligence and acumen, in a "creative" way. 
It  is therefore curious that we cannot draw the same conclusion about 
deduction that von Neumann rightly drew about chess-playing. Despite the 
apparent negative finaIity of Church's theorem, there is a positive result 
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which forms just as important a part of modern logical theory, which for 
all practical purposes would seem to vindicate Leibniz' expectations com- 
pletely or nearly so, and which undoubtedly will eventually have a profound 
impact on the way in which deduction problems are handled. Suppose that 
we put the general deduction problem as follows: deduce the statement 
from the ass~lrnptions J,,...,Jn. Each such problem is either solvable 
or not; and, if a solution exists in a given case, it will take the form of a 
deduction, or proof, of from the assumptions Jl,...,J,L. The somewhat 
surprising fact is that there exists an algorithm with which one can always 
calculate the solution to any such deduction problem-i.e., automatically 
constn~ct he appropriate deduction, or proof-provided that the problem 
is solvable. The proviso sounds unnecessary: how indeed could we expect 
the algorithm to construct a proof as solution in cases where no solution 
exists? The intention, however, behind the proviso is to state that the 
algorithm will not, in general, give any indication that no solution is forth- 
coming when this is in fact the case; when applied to unsolvable deduction 
problems (namely, those in which -Jl does not logically follow from the 
given assumptions ,l,,...,J,L), the calculation process called for by the 
algorithm will in general continue forever in theory and in practice be even- 
tually abandoned as inconclusive. Thus the algorithm is capable of settling 
deduction problems only if they are solvable; it cannot in general inform us 
that a deduction does not exist. On these grounds there are those who 
would prefer to call the procedure a semi-algorithm rather than an algo- 
rithm, reserving the latter term for those calculation procedures which 
always terminate after a finite (though not necesasrily predictable) amount 
of calculation; but so long as the two possibilities are borne in mind, the 
nomenclature is not of any great importance. 
Now it is not merely (as in the case of von Neumann's chess algorithm) 
that we have a proof of the existence of such a calculating procedure for 
the construction of proofs, without being able to exhibit and use it; we 
actually have the procedure itself. In fact, there is not just one procedure; 
there are many variants, which differ quite widely from each other. All 
share the property of allowing us to construct deductions automatically, in 
a machine-like manner; indeed the necessary calculations can be performed 
entirely by a computing machine, which need only be supplied in each case 
with the statement a and the assumptions J1,...,J,, in a suitably encoded 
form, together of course with the complete set of instructions constituting 
the calculation procedure. 
It is surely of immense philosophical interest, as well as being of great 
practical importance, that the task of deduction which is performed by 
human beings only through their use of intelligent ingenuity, of a subtle 
feeling for structure and abstract. formal beauty, and of other sublime and 
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elusive characteristics of the human mind, should also be performable by 
the well-defined, analytical, step-by-step behavior of a purely mechanical 
deterministic automaton. At the present time, however, the development 
of automatic deduction procedures is in its infancy. One is reminded of 
Dr. Johnson's remark likening a woman's preaching to a dog's walking on 
its hind legs: it is not done well; the wonder is that it is done at all. 
The purpose of the remainder of this article is to discuss the shortcomings 
of known automatic deduction procedures and to describe a recent theo- 
retical development, by the author of this paper, which apparently elimi- 
nates entirely one of the major obstacles to their practical exploitation. We 
shall see that there still remain further problems to be solved before auto- 
matic deductions on computing machines will replace routinely and on a 
large scale the heuristic deductions of the highly-trained intelligent human; 
but research towards this end is still at a very early stage, pursued in rela- 
tively few centers by relatively few people. The outlook for the future is 
extremely promising, and the goal is exciting. It is no less than the ability 
to imitate and amplify our own intellectual powers by artificial means. 
THE DAVIS-PUTNAM PROCEDURE 
Martin Davis and Hilary Putnam have presented a calculating procedure 
for automatically demonstrating the unsatisfiability of any unsatisfiable, 
finite set of statements expressed in the artificial language known to logi- 
cians as the first-order predicate calculus with function symb01s.~ This 
language is known to be rich enough in expressive power for formulating 
all of extant mathematics, and is the natural instrument to use, in place of 
ordinary, informal language, for mathematical analysis of logical problems. 
Each statement of this language has two sorts of symbol; the logical symbols 
(not, and, or, if  . . . then, if and only i f ,  there exists, for all) which have a 
fixed meaning, and the nonlogical symbols (the predicates, function sym- 
bols, individual constants, and individual variables) which can be given 
different meanings or interpretations. Thus, mare exactly, a statement in 
this language is really only a form or pattern or structure of a statement, 
namely that which is common to all those statements obtainable by inter- 
preting the nonlogical symbols in all the possible ways. For example, the 
simple statement-pattern 
( E x )  ( A  ( x )  & (x) ) 
is read: there exists an x such that x is an A and x is a B. By interpreting 
the individual variable x and the predicates A and B in different ways, we 
see for instance that each of the following quite different statements are all 
of this one pattern or form: 
there is an integer which is even and prime; 
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there is an animal which is cloven-hoofed and feathered; 
there is a set which is infinite and nondenumerable. 
Thus a statement-pattern, or formula, might turn into a true statement 
for some of its possible interpretations, and a false statement for the other 
possible interpretations. A formula is called satisfiable if there is at least 
one way of interpreting it so that it becomes a true statement; likewise a 
set of formulae is said to be satisfiable if there is at least one way of inter- 
preting all the nonlogical symbols in the formulae so that each formula in 
the set becomes a true statement. A formula, or set of formulae, which is 
not satisfiable in this sense is said to be unsatisfiable. For example, the 
folIowing set 
{ (Ax)B(x), (EY)-'B(Y)} 
of two formulae is unsatisfiable; for the first says that every x is a B while 
the second says that there is a y which is not a B; and there is no way of 
interpreting 'x,' 'y' and 'B' which will turn both formulae simultaneously 
into true statements. 
There is an intimate connection between the notion of unsatisfiability of 
a set of formulae and the notion of one formula 9 being a consequence of, 
or following from, a set {A,, ...,J%} of formulae. For 9 follows from 
{A,, ..., J,} just in case the set {A ,,..., J,r'g} is unsatisfiable, i.e., 
just in case there is no interpretation which wilI turn each of oQ1,...,J, into 
a true statement while turning 3 into a false statement. 
Thus Davis and Putnam's calculating procedure is easily used as an 
automatic deduction procedure; to deduce from (J l,...,J,,) we simply 
do the calculation to demonstrate the set {A,, ...,J,,-.$} to be 
unsatisfiable. 
In order to explain the essentials of the Davis-Putnam procedure without 
getting lost in a welter of logical details we shall state without proof that 
every set of formulae {J1, ...,&) can be transformed by a series of 
straightforward operations into another set of formulae { ~ , , . . . , ~ , , }  which 
has a very special standard form to make calculating easy, and, what is 
most important, which satisfies the condition: 
{g , ,  ...,gn} is unsatisfiable if and only if 
{ J , > . . . J J , )  is. 
Without more ado we shall from this point onwards assume that we always 
have our set of formulae in this standard form, which we shall now describe. 
The set { g l ,  ...,Bn} is in standard form just in case each of the gj in 
the set is a disjunction of literals; a literal is either an aromic formula or else 
the negation of an atomic formula; an atomic formula is an expression con- 
sisting of a predicate symbol followed by one or more terms, separated by 
commas and enclosed in a pair of parentheses; finally a term is any expres- 
sion which is either an individual variable, an individual constant, or else 
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consists of a function symbol followed by one or more terms, separated by 
commas and enclosed in a pair of parentheses. 
We shall use capital italic letters for predicate symbols, lower case italic 
letters from the top of the alphabet ("f' onwards) for individual variables, 
lower case italic letters from the bottom of the alphabet ("a" to "s" inclu- 
sive) for individual constants and function symbols, with numerical sub- 
scripts if needed. 
Since the order and multiplicity of literals in a disjunction are logically 
irrelevant, we shall treat each gj in the set {-Q1, ...,g,,) as simply the set of 
literals it contains; thus the pattern of the systems we deal with is the very 
simple one of a finite set of finite sets of literals. Davis and Putnam call a 
finite set of literals a clause, and we will also follow this usage. In order to 
complete our vocabuIary of terse names, let us call a finite set of clauses a 
strrtctrrre. The following are examples of structures: 
S,: {(B(x)17 {c-.B(a>)Z; 
S,: {{P(x,g(x->,y, h(x,y) ,z,k(x,y,z) I ) ,  {--.P(rr,l*, 
m(v>,w,n(v,w>,t> 11; 
s:: { {+P(x,Y,u) ,+P(Y,z,v) ,+P(x,v,w) ,P(U>Z,W) 1, 
{"p(x,~,u),+P(~,z,v),~P(u,z,w),p(x,v,w)}, 
{P(g(x,y),x,y I, {P(x,h(x,y),y) 1, {f'(x,y,f (AY) ) 1, 
{+P(k(x),x,k(x) ) ) I ;  
S,: {{N(a) 1, {dN(x),N(s(x-)))}. 
The individua1 variables in each clause of a structure are tacitly under- 
stood to have the universal interpretation; each clause is thus interpreted to 
mean what it would normally mean if it were prefixed with universal quanti- 
fiers binding its variables, with disjunction symbols supplied between its 
literals, in place of the commas. 
It is to structures, then, that the Davis-Putnam calculating procedure is 
to be applied. In order to explain the calculating procedure, we next intro- 
duce the concept of the Herbrand Universe of a structure. 
Each structure has a vocabulary of constants y o ,  y,, ...,y,&; where gi is 
the set of function symbols occurring in the structure with i terms as argu- 
ments, and 9, is the set of individual constants which occur in the struc- 
ture (if none occur, as in 3, and S, above, then 9, is the set (a)). The 
Herbrand Universe of the structure with vocabulary ~ o , . . , , ~ ,  is then 
defined to be the set of all terms consiructible solely from the symbols in the 
vocabulary yo,..,,2,. This set 3 may be finite or infinite, depending on 
the structure's vocabulary. For example, the 3 for the structure S, above 
is finite, being simply the set {a); but So, S, and 3, each have infinite 
Herbrand Universes, that of 3, being, for-example: 
{a, s(a>,  s(s(a) 1, s(s(s(a))),...,) 
while those of S, and 8, have a more elaborate form. 
ON AUTOMATIC DEDUCTION 75 
One of the basic operations in the Davis-Putnam calculating procedure is 
lled instantiation, and it consists of constructing a new clause from one of 
e clauses in the given structure by replacing each variable with a member 
the structure's Herbrand Universe J[. The same member of must 
lace each occurrence of the same variable, but different variables may 
replaced by different members of A. Any structure which consists 
tireIy of clauses obtained in this way from clauses of the structure 3 is 
d a substructiire of S. It is easy to see that a structure S which has an 
ite Herbrand Universe will have infinitely many distinct substructures, 
11e an S with a finite Herbrand Universe has only a finite number of 
uctures. For example, the structure s, has only the following three 
uctures: 
{ { B ( a ) ) ) ;  
{ { + B ( a ) ) ) ;  
{ { B ( a > ) ,  {-.B(a)>). 
It will be noticed from our definition of substructure that none of thc 
appearing in a substructure can contain any variables. They all 
nt basic statements which become true or false the moment an inter- 
etation is given to the predicate symbols, individual constants, and func- 
n symbols which they contain. As a result of this, we can very much 
lify the notion of an interpretation for substructures; essentially, from 
bstract point of view, a substructure is given a meaning when we 
ify which of its literals is true and which is false. We need  lot specify 
lr meaning over and above their truth value. Once an interpretation of a 
tructure is given in this way, the substructure is satisfied by it just in 
there is no clause in the substructure which does not have at least one 
1 in it which is true in the interpretation. Collecting all these ideas and 
g thcm down to the bare essentials, it is not difficult to see that 
structure is satisfiable if and only if  there is a set J of its literals with 
roperty that no clause in the substructure fails to contain at least one 
er of J, and with the further property that J does not contain a pair 
erals one of  which is simply the negation of the other. 
ch a set J of literals is thought of as a specification of which literals 
o be true in the tacitly understood interpretation. Now we can say 
a substructure is unsatisfiable just in case it is not satisfiable in 
ense. The third substructure of S,, for instance, is unsatisfiablc, 
e the first and second are both satisfiable. 
ow the Davis-Putnam calculating procedure is based on the funda- 
tal fact, discovered by Herbrand,Vhat a structure S is unsatisfiable if 
only if it has an unsatisfiable finite substriicture. This theoretical result 
e of the most important and beautiful in all of modern logical theory; 
ces the question of the satisfiability of an arbitrary structure S, 
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which involves the impossible task of "searching" the class of all possible 
interpretations of 3 ,  to a series of answerable questions concerning the 
finite substructures of S. One can always discover, in a finite number of 
steps, whether a finite substructure is satisfiable or not. 
The specific calculation to be done on a structurc S is organized around 
two principles: the first principle is a systematic way of setting out the 
finite substructures of S in a sequence 
S1, S2, S 3 , . - S F  
of such a kind that every finite substructure of S wiII eventudly occur at 
some place in the sequence. There are many ways of doing this, as we shall 
see. The second principle is simply a systematic way of testing any givcn 
finite substructure for satisfiability. 
Again, there are a great many different ways of doing this. Historically, 
Davis and Putnam's calculation involved two specific choices for the first 
and second principles; but for the purposes of our present discussion we 
need not now enter into these. We shall instead consider any two specific 
choices for the first and second principles as a Davis-Putnanz procedure. 
Our objective is for the moment to discuss the general case in abstraction 
from any particular exemplification of it. 
One useful fact may be noted, in connection with the enumeration of 
finite substructures. The concept of substructure also applies to substruc- 
tures themselves; one substructure Si being a substructure of another one 
Sj just in case Si C 3 (is., all the clauses of Si are clauses of 
S i ) .  It is easy to see that if Si is unsatisfiable, so is any Si such that 
2 c $; hence it would suffice to examine each of a sequence S1, S2, ..., 
which has the property that every finite substructure is a subset of at least 
one $ in the sequence. Davis and Putnarn themselves exploited this prin- 
cipIe. But however the enumeration of the finite substructures is done, 
there will always be an earliest point in the sequence when an unsatisfiable 
finite substructure is detected, if the method is applied to an unsatisfiable 
structure 3. Indeed, the matter can be put in this way: that each method of 
enumeration associates a number with each unsatisfiable structure 6, 
nameIy, the earliest point in the enumeration of the substructures of 6 at 
which an unsatisfiable finite substructum occurs. A second number is likc- 
wise associated, namely the number of clauses in this earliest unsatisfiable 
finite substructure of S. If either (or both) of these two numbers is very 
large for a given structure &' and given method of enumeration, then the 
calculation will not be practically possible for that 6 using that method, 
The unfortunate fact about Davis-Putnam calculations is that, for almost 
all "interesting" structures S, and for all the methods of enumeration that 
have been tried, one or the other of these two numbers is absol~itely 
enormous. The practical conscquence of this is that the calculations cannot 
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be done, even on the fastest and largest of modern electronic computers. 
 his enormity problem can be easily illustrated with the help of the struc- 
tures S, and (j, exhibited earlier. The particular method of enumeration 
we use in this illustration is that used by QuineY6 Dreben? Gimore8 and is 
very much like that of Davis and Putnam. To follow it, we first note that 
any Herbrand Universe A falls naturally into finite subsets s o ,  A,, 
s,,"., where in general Sf is just the set of all terms in 3 the maximum 
depth of composition of which is j or less. For example, for S, these finite 
subsets of 3 look like: 
A,,: {a) 
37,: {a, k(a), g(a,a), h(a,a), f(a,a)l 
A,: {a, k(a), g(a,a), h(a,a), f(a,a), k(k(a) 1, 
k(g(a,a)) ,..., etc.) 
These subsets are sometimes called the levels of the Herbrand Universe, 
They give a kind of pattern to the otherwise confusing combiiatorial jungle 
of A. Now the substructure obtained from a structure S by forming all 
instances of clauses in S that can be formed using terms from a finite 
subset 8 of 3 is denoted by G ( S ) ,  and is said to be the 8-saturated 
substi-ucture of 6. It is of course finite, since and are finite. It is clear 
that if 
Go, GI, 8%>...> 
is any sequence of finite subsets of with the property that 
CO 
A = U Gj, Gj C Gi+l for all j, 
i - 0  
then the sequence of Gj-saturated substructures of S, 
B o ( S ) ,  G l ( S ) ,  G2(S)7-..7 
will satisfy the conditions of the first principle of a Davis-Putnam calcula- 
tion. But the successivc levels of 3 have this property, i.e., 
a0 
3 = U Aj, dlj C 3 ,+, for all j; 
j = O  
and so the sequence of level-saturated substructures 
A , ( S > ,  & ( S ) ,  Jl,CS)I..., 
is suitable for the first principic of a Davis-Putnam calculation. I t  is this 
sequence, which has a certain naturalness, that the authors cited have 
employed. 
For the structure S, the earliest value of j such that sj($,) is unsatis- 
fiable is 3; and the number of clauses in s,((j,) is approximately 1018. 
For the structure S.,, the earliest value of j such that dij(S,) is unsatisfi- 
able is 5 ;  and the nimber of clauses in J{, (S,) is approx~mately 
These numbcrs are arrived at by quite simple combinatorial methods given 
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in another paper.g They are quite small examples of what one means by 
enormous numbers. 
The method of enumerating finite substructures by means of saturation 
sequences Go, g,, G,, ..., of finite subsets of Jl seems to bc inherently 
prone to this difficulty. Yet there is a curious observation to be made: for 
any particular unsatisfiable structure S there is always a finite subset <p 
of J[ which has the properties: p(S)  is an unsatisfiabIe substructure; if 
& is any proper subset of 9, &(S) is a satisfiable substructure; and 
neither 9 nor p ( S )  are enormous. We have elsewherelo called such 
subsets 9 proof sets. For example, proof sets for S, and S, arc: 
for S, 9 = {a; s ( a ) ;  m ( g ( a )  1; h(a,nz(g(a))  1; 
~z(s (a>,h(a ,m(s (a> 1 1); k(a ,m(g(a)  ) , n (g (a ) ,h (a ,m(~(a) ) ) ) ) ) ,  
for S:!, P = {a, lz(a,a), k (h (a ,a ) ) ,  s (k ( l z (a ,a) ) ,a ) )  
with 6 and 4 members respectively. ip(S2) has 1512 cIauses; gl(S,) has 
roughly 10,000 clauses, Neither of these two numbers is enormous. 
The claim made above that every unsatisfiable S has a small proof set 
cP was too rash: wc should have said, every S for wl7ich a humnrz could 
- 
possibly discover a proof, or follow a proof, o f  unsntisfiability, has a small 
proof set. With this qualification, the claim is quite defensibIe. For a proof 
which a human can grasp cannot itself be an enormous object. Indeed the 
sort of proof one normally encounters in mathematical contexts is quite 
short-a few pages at most, and most often much shorter than that. The 
number of distinct constructions or concepts in any one proof is also 
small-else the human mind could not handle the complexity with any- 
thing Iike the customary amount of effort and mental capacity that is 
available. These heuristic considerations, together with empirical evidence 
from a wide variety of proofs, have led us to suppose that the small size and 
limited complexity of "humanly possible" proof sets are both inherent 
properties of them, and reflect ultimately thc limited capacity of thc human 
mind to handle more than a certain amount of symbolic structural variety 
at any one time. 
This same argument would lead to thc conclusion that an unsatisfiable 
structure S whose proof set 9 is very large and complex may well be 
beyond the ability of thc human to handle; even if a proof were discovered 
mechanically for such an S, it might be too hard to follow-to kcep in 
mind all at once. 
Returning to the enormity problem evidenced by thc saturation sequcnce 
method, we now see that, for each unsatisfiable S, there is a saturation 
sequence which very quickly disposes of S, nameIy, any sequence whose 
first subset is a proof set gJ for 3. What seems, however, to be the case is 
that there is no one saturation sequence which uniformly disposes this 
quickly of every S. And that is precisely what a Davis-Putnam calculating 
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procedure must havc if it is to be of any practical interest. This situation 
seems to be unavoidable, and has discouraged a number of people from 
pursuing further research on automatic deduction. If it were only possible 
to develop a calculating procedure which somehow simultaneously followed 
out all possible saturation sequences for a structure S, there would be a 
glimmer of hope-for as we have scen, there is always an "optimal" satura- 
tion sequence for a given 3, the trouble being that the optimal saturation 
sequence is obtained by a different method for different structures. Such a 
uniform method would in effect pick out the proof set 2 for S, much as 
humans do, or try to do, when attacking a proof-problem creatively. 
rom the discussion so far, one would suppose that such a method could 
t possibly exist. It is a pleasant surprise, therefore, to find that such a 
od does exist and has just the desirable properties described in the 
ous paragraph. We explain this new method in the next section, 
E RESOLUTION METHOD 
e recalI that a suturrrtion sequence for a structure S is a sequence 
C,,..., of finite subsets of the Herbrand Universe A of S which 
PertY 
to 
A = U Gj, gj S Gi+l for a11 j. 
1 = o  
A Davis-Putnam procedure using this kind of sequence consists of testing 
successively the substructures 
G o ( S ) ,  S1(S) ,  G2(S>,..-, 
until one is found which is unsatisfiable. So far we have paid no attention 
to the methods by which a substructure can be tested for unsatisfiability, 
except to say that there are many of them, In order to lay the groundwork 
for thc new automatic deduction procedure, we examine now a particular 
way of testing substructures for unsatisfiability which lends itself to theo- 
retical investigation and to a certain generalization of which we shall make 
important use. 
Suppose that we are given two clauses, C and 9, of some substructure. 
And suppose that one of the literals in C (say, _C) and one of the literals 
in (say, 32.1) are exactly like each other except that one is negated and 
the other is not. Then the following new clause: 
(L' - {XI1 u (g - { 3 1 )  
constructed by pooling all the literals of C except 1: and all the literals of 
9 except 3f1, is called a resolvent of the clauses C and g. (,? and 9 may 
have several different resolvents, since there may be more than one pair 
x, 51 of complementary literals with _C and 31 in C and 9 respectivcly, 
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It is easy to see that if a substructurc ,g is satisfiable, then so is any set 
gj of clauses obtained by adding to -4 one or more resolvents of a pair of 
clauses in "4, and conversely. For if -4 is satisfiable, there is a set J of its 
literals such that every clause in "4 contains a member of J, but no pair 
of complementary literals is in 4. Thus in forming a resolvent 
(C - {L}) u W l -  {3i}) 
of two clauses C and CJJ of the substructure "4, we form a clause which 
must also contain a literal in J since each of C and do, and these cannot 
bc both _C and 3[, which are complementary. 
Since any such set of clauses is satisfiable if and only if ,'I is satis- 
fiable, this is true in particular of the set obtained by adding to ,.$ all the 
resolvents of pairs of clauses in J. This set is denoted by a(,j), and is 
called the resolution of --I. We are to think of the resolution of any set .,jl 
of clauses as another set %(J)  obtained from "4 by the performance of 
a single operation on -4 (although of course it can be a rather complicated, 
long operation). 
From the definition of resolvent it is easy to see that two clauses C and 
9 might have the empty clause as a resolvent. This wi1I happen if C is {_C] 
and is {3/21} and 1: and ,q/ are complementary literals. And any set of 
clauses which contains the empty clause { } is of course unsatisfiable; for 
there can be no set &' of literals such that { } contains one of the literals 
in J. Thus if a ( J )  contains { ), where ,$ is any set of clauses, then 
-4 is unsatisfiable. 
This observation leads to a smooth, uniform way of testing a substruc- 
ture "4 for unsatisfiability. In order to depict it compactly, we introduce a 
generalization of the notation i k ( J )  by the convention that 
LRO(J) is '-4, 
and LR1'+-l (Ll) is LR (LR" (J) ) . 
We now call the set 3'"-4) thc nth resolutiort of ,j1, so that J<(J), tltc 
resolution of "4, is now also called the first resolutiotz of -4, 
Now if ,4 is a finite substructure, there must be a point at which 
gIn(J) and P+l(J) are the same set of clauses. To see this, note that 
there can be only finitely many literals in ,4, and hence only finitely many 
sets of these literals. Thus we cannot continue to add further sets of these 
litcrals without eventually exhausting all the possiblc ones. Any set of 
clauses which has the property that 
R(9) = L!3 
is called a resolved set of clauses, provided only that it does not contain 
{ }. We can now see that for any finite substructure -4 the sequence 
LRO(J), LR1(JZ), a2(v4),. . . ,  
must everttucrlly terminate in a resolved set o f  claiises or it1 ~i set of clauses 
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that contains { ). In the first case, J is satisfiable, in the second case, 
"4 is unsatisfiable. 
In order to prove that "4 is satisfiable if one of its nth resolutions is a 
resolved set, we need only show that any resolved set 9 of clauses is satis- 
fiable. And in order to show this, we need only indicate how to construct 
the required set J of literals, To this end, suppose that _C, _C,,,.,.,_C, is a 
complete list of the atomic formulas which occur in the (fin&) resolved 
set $', whether negated or not; and let 34, 31,, ...,Sf& be the list of their 
respective negations. We then define the set J to comprise the literals on 
the list J,, J,,...,J,, where we choose the successive literals Jj for 
i = 1, ..., k by &e following method: J j  is to be x., unless some clause in 
LJ consists entirely of complements of literals on t-hc partial list J,, ..., J, 
thereby determined; in that case J, is to be stj. It is clear that the set J so 
determined does not contain a pair of complementary literals; but also 
every clause in 9 contains at least one literal in J. For suppose not; then 
for some smallest number j, 1 L j L k, there must be a clause C in 2) 
which consists entirely of complements of literals in the partial list J,, ...,Jj. 
By the method of choosing the elements of J, Jj must therefore be ,71j. 
Since j is the smallest such number, the clause C must contain _Cj. But since 
Jj was chosen to be c/2., there must exist in 9 a clause which consists 
entirely of complements of literals in the list J,, ..., Jj-,,_Cj. (Note that 
j > 1 because 9 is a resolved set and cannot contain both of the clauses 
{_Cj) and {sfj), for then it would have to contain { 1). Again, since j is 
the smallest such number, 9 must contain a{j. But then the clause 
( C  - {Lj}) U ($ - {Bi)) 
consists entirely of complements of literals in the partiaI list J,,...,Jj-l. 
Since this clause is a resolvent of C and g, and since 9 is a resolved set of 
clauses, we conclude that this clause is in 9, and thus that the leastness of 
the number j is contradicted. Hence every clause in g contains a literal 
in J, and 3 is satisfiable. 
The outcome of this theoretical discussion is that in the procedure of 
calculating successively the nth resolutions of a substructure 9: 
9O(LZ-?)> 92($'),..., 
we have a complete test for the unsatisfiabiIity of gj: is unsatisfiable if 
and only if i@($) contains the empty clause { ), where rt is the smallest 
number for which p(.$$l) = P+l(a). Such a number is guaranteed 
to exist by the finiteness of the substructure 9. 
Now we can express very compactly, using this resolution method, the 
overall calculating procedure of the Davis-Putnam type which uses the 
saturation sequence technique for generating successive substructures of 
the structure 3. As before, let Go, Q, s2, ... be any sequence of finite 
subsets of the Herbrand Universe 3 of S with the property 
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A =: U Gjy Sj C for all j .  
J = o  
Then the structure S is unsatisfiable if and only if, for some j artd sonte 
n, the set 
P ( B j ( S ) )  
contains the empty clause. 
We are now in a position to introduce the key idea of the new automatic 
deduction procedure, which consists essentially of a ccrtain generalization 
of the concept of resolution. The operation as we have defined it so far 
applies only to substructures and their nth resolutions, i.e., to finite sets of 
clauses none of whose literals contain any variables. We shall extend the 
operation of resolution so that it also applies to structirres in general, the 
new feature being that the clauses in structures can contain literals which 
have variables in them. 
When we earlier introduced the notion of instanliation we discussed it 
only very briefly. It now becomes necessary to analyze this operation fully 
and carefully, with the help of an appropriate notation. 
Let C be any clause, c(l,,...,Q,, any set of distinct variabIes, and 
'&,...yg,t any terms. Then by 
CC511/CV1,...Y Z,/CVnI 
we denote that clause which consists of all the distinct literals 
xr~l/qly...y ~,,/v,,I 
where _C is in C, and lJ[~l/ql,..., Zn/CV,,] is the literal obtained from 
_C by rewriting _C from left to right, but writing gi in the new literal 
wherever q, occurs in 1J. For example: 
P(x,y,u) [g(x,y)/x, x/y, Y/U, f (x,y 1/21 
is the literal 
P(g(x,y) ,x,Y) 
and 
{c'P(x,y,u) -,P(y,z,v) +P(x,v,w) P(U,Z,W)) [Y/v, u/wI 
is 
{+P(X,Y,U) +P(y,z,y) P(u,z,u)).  
Whenever the terms gl, ...,g,, are a11 in the Herbrand Universe 3 of a 
structure S, C is a clause in S, and Cj",, ...,ct I,, are all the distinct variables 
which occur in C, then the clause C[gl/~71,...,g,,/C(1,,] is precisely what 
we earlier defined to be an instance of C, and the substructures of S are 
thus finite sets of clauses each having the form 
cr 41cl/CV1Y...,~,,/~V,*1 
with C in S, CV CV, all the distinct variables of c, and 9% ,..., 2% in 3. 
Consider then the substructure G ( S ) ,  where B is any finite subset of 
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the Herbrand Universe ,J[ of S. From the above remark, every clause in 
c;(S) has the form 
- 
C C411/CVl,...,~,/C(l,l 
for some C in S ;  qI,, ...,q In being all the distinct variables of C and 
q, ...,gn being terms in the set _C. By the definition of _C(S), the con- 
- 
verse is true-any such clause is a member of the substructure G ( S ) .  
Next, consider the resolution 9 (G ( S )  ) of this substructure. Any 
clause J{ in 9 (_C(S)  ) which is not already in Q ( S )  must be a resolvent 
of two clauses which are already in st&'). Let these two clauses be 
CCZl/c(3,,...Y Z,,/c[Inl and 9I)[CU1/?9l1, ...,91r/?/91r1 
where C and 9 are clauses in S, ,,..., CJ'n,~I,nt.yVf are in 9, CV c(ln 
are all the distinct variables in C, and ?/\l,,...,Cfgv are all the distinct 
variables in 9. 
Since J{ is a resolvent of C[g'/q ,,..., g,/C(l,] and 'Jl[w,/~~? ,,..., 
~ T / ? j l v ] ,  there must be a pair _C, 3{ of complementary literals, such that 
d: is in the clause C[~,/C(3,,...,~n/c[?n], and ,gl is in the clause 
$[CU1/CII',,*..yCIJr/Z!~T1- 
In terms of the notation already introduced for the resolution of a set of 
clauses, we can express the situation described above by writing: 
%(G(S)) c G(9( ' s ) ) .  
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Here, a ( S )  now means the structure obtained by adding to all the 
clauses that are resolvents of a pair C,CJ of clauses in S in the new, gener- 
alized sense. And we have stated that any resolvent of a pair of clauses in 
the Q-saturated substructure Q(S) of S is a clause in the S-saturated 
substructure of the resolution a ( S )  of S. 
Another way of putting the point is to say simply that the operations of 
$-saturation and resolution semicommute. 
I t  is a straightforward consequence of this basic property that 
P ( G ( S ) )  C B ( P ( S ) )  
holds for any structure S, any finite subset g of the Herbrand Universe 
,g[ of ,C (indeed, any subset whatever), and any natural number n. This 
relation is the fundamental theoretical result on which the new automatic 
deduction method is based; we are now in a position to state the new 
method. 
Recall that, where Go, G,, G, is any saturation sequence for the struc- 
ture S, 6 is unsatisfiable if and only if the set 
P ( S j ( S ) )  
contains { ) for some j and some n. Then by the fundamental property 
given above, we must also have that S is unsatisfiable if and only if the set 
S j ( P C S ) )  
contains { ) for some j and some n. But the gj-saturated substructure 
G , ( P ( S ) )  of the structure p ( S )  contains { ) if and only if the 
structure P ( S )  contains { ). For mere instantiation over -cj cannot 
produce the empty clause { ) from a nonempty clause. We conclude 
therefore that: 
the structure &' is unsatisfiable if and only i f  the structure pl7'(S) con- 
tains { ), for some n. 
This is the essential form of the new method of automatic deduction. The 
important feature of it is that the use of the saturation sequence -Go, G,, 
G,,..., has dropped out. This means that the value of n for which -p(,S) 
first contains ( ) will be the same as it would have been for the optimal 
choice of saturation sequence for S using a Davis-Putnam method; but as 
we saw, the optimal saturation sequence would be one which began with a 
proof set 2 for S. Hence the new method irnplicirly selects a proof set 9 
for each different unsatisfiable structure S to which it is applied, but does 
so in a uniform way. 
It  is of interest that the structures 3, and S, used as examples, in the 
previous section, of the enormity problem, behave with extreme docility 
under the new method. In fact, we have: 
a1 (S , )  contains { } (Ji:'(,y,) contains { 1. 
- 
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In the next and final section we discuss the automatic deduction problem 
in the light of our resolution method. 
AIthough the resolution method of automatic deduction appears to solve 
the enormity obstacIe which plagues Davis-Putnam methods, it is not clear 
that it does not have an enormity obstacle of its own. The parameter n in 
the method-the nth resolution of S being the earliest one to contain 
{ }--can still be enormous, for some unsatisfiable S; but worse, it is 
quite possible that the earliest p ( S )  to contain { }, even for small n, 
may often be an enormous stmcture, even though is not. (Presumably 
we would never consider working with initial structures S which are them- 
selves enormous.) In that case, the new method would be of no practical 
use for demonstrating the unsatisfiability of such structures S. 
We do not at present have sufficient theoretical knowledge concerning 
the rate of growth of p ( S )  with n and S to make a useful judgment in 
this matter. There is also lacking a sufficient body of empirical knowledge, 
derived from applying the resolution method to a wide variety of structures, 
on which we might base an evaluation. Both of these areas remain to be 
explored in future research, 
There is a school of investigators who have been trying a somewhat 
different approach to attaining automatic deduction. This is the "heuristic" 
school, pioneered by NewelI and Simon.11 The method they adopt is essen- 
tially that of analyzing the strategies, maneuvers, and "tricks" of the skilled 
human practitioner of deduction, and executing these mechanically by 
suitably programming a computer. Analogous methods have been tried for 
complex board games such as checkers.12 The attraction in this approach is 
that by its very nature it tends to bring understanding of human intellectual 
processes and to lead towards artificial reproductions of them in machine 
behavior. This is a very important objective of behavioral science and is 
rightly receiving more and more attention at the present time. Nevertheless, 
in the field of automatic deduction the successes of heuristic methods have 
been meager, when judged by the kinds of deduction which have been 
achieved and the effort req~~ired to achieve them. It does not seem likely 
that heuristic methods can possibly surpass the methods we have discussed 
in the body of this article; for these logical methods are based on a direct 
confrontation and study of the deduction problems themselves, construed 
as well-defined problems of combinatorial mathematics; whereas heuristic 
methods are intrinsically formulated at second remove from the deduction 
problems themselves, focussed as they are on the response of the human 
intelligence to these problems. Indeed, the response of a human to deduc- 
tion problems is likely to be affected rather strongly by that human's knowl- 
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edge and understanding of their logical properties and of the efficacy of 
some of the hard-won combinatorial techniques for solving them. Further- 
more the heuristic analysis of human problem-solving behavior is without 
much point unless it be directed at the most efficient and successful 
examples of such behavior. It may well be that before long the most effi- 
cient and successful problem-solving behavior-as far as deduction prob- 
lems are concerned-will be that exhibited by machines in the process of 
executing precisely the sort of combinatorial calculations we have been 
discussing, or  even by humans executing these same procedures, albeit at 
a slower pace than machines. 
There is no avoiding the profound philosophical issue which lurks behind 
this entire discussion. What do we mean when we say that an intelligent 
human reasons deductively, or uses creative insight into a deduction prob- 
lem in order to find a proof? It is difficult to find anything more in this kind 
of assertion than that a proof is found, and we cannot say how it is found. 
There appears to be an element of spontaneity, or randomness, or non- 
reproducibility in the human search procedure, as though the mind were 
roving through the possibilities in a not-completely-determined way, which 
it would be absurd to try to model by a systematic or algorithmic process. 
This may well be so. But there is no need to argue that human intellectual 
processes are automatic, in order to compare their performance with that 
of the automatic deduction procedures we have been discussing; nor can it 
be argued that since human intellectual processes are not automatic, they 
must necessarily be superior in performance to any process that is auto- 
matic. Indeed, that is just what remains to be seen, There is nothing intrin- 
sically impossible in the idea that a human-designed artifact should out- 
perform its human designers in the function that it is constructed to fulfil; 
we are already outlifted by the crane, outsped by the automobile, outleaped 
by the airplane and rocket, and outcomputed by the multiplying and 
dividing of the simple desk-model calculating machines. 
It  is not a foregone conclusion, at  present, that we are going to be out- 
classed at solving deduction problems by suitably programmed automatic 
computing devices; but the odds are that we shall be, and overwhelmingly 
so. If and when this comes to pass, we must all be glad of it, for then there 
will be so much more time for us to think and to dream. 
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APPENDIX. THE CALCULATION O F  RESOLVENT'S. 
THE FACTORS OF A CLAUSE. 
Let C be any clause (_C ,,..., _C,). For each pair _C, _Cj of distinct 
terals in C, construct if possible a new clause from C by the following 
Step I .  Set C'O' = C, and k = 0. Then go to Step 2. 
Step 2. Given Cfk) check whether _C,Vi) = _Cjoi), If so, terminate the 
ess with 6'" as the constructed clause. Otherwise go to Step 3. 
ep 3. Let $'J and be the two symbols at which _Cp and first 
reckoning from the left to the right. If neither of w,q?  is an indi- 
variable, or else if one of w,q is an individual variable and the 
he initial symbol of a term containing that variable, then terminate 
process with no clause having been constructed. Otherwise go to Step 4. 
tep 4. If both of the symbols v,ql are individual variables, let 5 be 
arlier, and ?)I the later of them, in the alphabetical order 
t ,  11, V, ).V, X ,  3'1 2, tll U11 V1, W1,  XI, Yl, 21, tz, . . . 
he individual variables; while if one of q,!,C[? is an individual variable 
the other is the initial symbol of a term, let 5 be that term and 7f) be 
t variable; and in either case construct 
C'"+ 1' cCU'[g/$v], 
k, and return to Step 2. 
en applied to a clause C for all possible pairs of distinct literals in C, 
IS process yields zero or more clauses, which are called immediate factors 
. The process is then applied to each of these clauses in turn, to obtain 
immediate factors (if any), We continue in this way until no more 
ses are produced. The set of all distinct clauses obtained by this iterative 
cedure, together with the clause C itself, constitutes the set of factors of 
cIause C. Two clauses are not considered distinct if they differ only by 
one-to-one change of variables. 
e entire process described is called the factorization algorithm, and 
ays yields a nonempty set of clauses when applied to a clause C. (For at 
st C itself is in the set.) 
Let C and Q be any two clauses. In order to compute all the resolvents 
(if any) of C and 9, execute the following procedure for each pair of 
factors J,g of C , 9  respectively, and each pair of literals in J and 
sing: 
Step 1. Check to see if one of 11,3171' is negated and the other unnegated. 
If not, terminate the procedure with no clause having been constructed. 
Otherwise go to Step 2, 
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Step 2. put Jinl = ,~ [~I /C[? , , . .+ ,~ , , , /C[J ,~ ,~ ,  g'" = ~ t ~ l / ? ! ~ , ~ - ~ ~ , ~ ~ ~ / 9 J ~ , ~ l ,  
and k = 0; where CV1,...,q3BL are a11 the distinct variables of J in alpha- 
betical order, and CfY,, ...,$VqL are all the distinct variables of in alpha- 
betical order. Then go to Step 3. 
Step 3. If fkl and ,71'"' are identical except for the negation symbol, 
terminate the procedure having constructerl the following clause: 
(J'" - {L'"')) u (g'" - {St"}). 
Otherwise go to Step 4. 
Step 4. Ignoring the negation symbol which precedes one of _C"5',3~u~1, 
let C[J and cijl be the two symbols with which _C"*' and s f k )  first differ. 
If neither of $'J,C(l is an individual variable, or else if one of them is an 
individual variable and the other is the initial symboI of a term containing 
that variable, terminate the procedure with no clause having been con- 
smrcted. Othenvise go to Step 5. 
Step 5.  If both and C(1 are individual variables, let 5 be the earlier 
and ClJJ the later of them in alphabetical order; while if one of g,C(? is an 
individual variable and the other is the initial symbol of a term, let 9 be 
that term and 2fI that variable; and in either case, construct 
J'k+l' = 'p'[3"7j1], LJ'"+" = 9'" '[5/4p3, 
add 1 to k, and return to Step 3. 
The entire process described is called the resolvent algorithm; when this 
process is applied to a pair C ,g  of clauses, the set (possibly empty) of all 
the distinct clauses constructed by it is the set of resolvents of C and g, 
C. REMARKS ON THE TWO ALGORITHMS. 
As we observed in the body of the article, the resolvents (if any) com- 
puted by the resolvent algorithm for two clauses C and -g which contain 
no variables (and which hence have no factors other than themselves) are 
simply the clauses (if any) 
(C - {XI) u ( 9  - ~31> 
where 1 is in C, 31 is in 9 ,  and _C and s[ are complementary literals. 
This is quite easy to see from the way the resolvent algorithm is stated. 
The proof that 
S2(G(S>) c G(LR(S))  
(where S is any structure, -G is any subset of the Herbrand Universe dl of 
S, and %(J), for any set J of clauses, is the set J together with all 
resolvents of all pairs of clauses in J), is long and somewhat tedious. 
It is given in full in another paper13 and we forego reproducing it here. 
The notion of factor, and the factorization algorithm, are strictly auxiliary 
to the notion of resolvent and to the resolvent algorithm. It would have been 
possible to avoid their use altogether, at the cost of complicating the 
resolvent algorithm itself to an intolerable extent. As it is, one i s  slightly 
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uncomfortable at having to define a resolvent as something obtained by the 
~erformance of an elaborate piece of data-processing; but there seems to 
be no other way of doing it. 
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